Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy
Volume 5
Issue 1 A Festschrift in Honor of Arthur C.
Nelson on the Occasion of his Retirement Agenda for Building a Changing World
Responsibly: Commentaries and Reflections by
Leaders in Urban Planning, Policy, and Design

Article 7

Is the Pandemic Causing a Return to Urban Sprawl?
Richard B. Peiser
Harvard University, rpeiser@gsd.harvard.edu

Matt Hugel
Harvard University, hugel@gsd.harvard.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp
Part of the Urban, Community and Regional Planning Commons, Urban Studies Commons, and the
Urban Studies and Planning Commons

Recommended Citation
Peiser, Richard B. and Hugel, Matt () "Is the Pandemic Causing a Return to Urban Sprawl?," Journal of
Comparative Urban Law and Policy: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1 , Article 7, 26-41.
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/jculp/vol5/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information,
please contact gfowke@gsu.edu.

Peiser and Hugel: Return to Urban Sprawl?

IS THE PANDEMIC CAUSING A RETURN TO URBAN SPRAWL?
Richard Peiser* and Matthew Hugel†
ABSTRACT
Urban sprawl is a catch-all term and a scapegoat for everything that is bad
about urban growth today, such as congestion, blight, monotony, and ecological
destruction. In recent decades, sprawl might have attenuated as America
experienced a period of urban revival even as technology made working from home
(WFH) and shopping from home possible nearly anywhere. The onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the adoption of infrastructures and forced
firms to rethink the necessity of workplaces. Retailers have accelerated the pace of
online sales and home deliveries by years if not decades. These and other advances
have decoupled people from their workplaces, shopping and other activities usually
associated with density. Indeed, the sudden spurning of urban density attributable
to the pandemic raises fundamental questions for the future of cities. While the
pandemic has accelerated trends in people moving out of denser neighborhoods in
metropolitan areas in favor of smaller metros, suburban, and exurban locations, the
major shift in net migration is from a drop in people moving into central cities. This
paper contextualizes pandemic era migration literature with prior studies of urban
sprawl to derive a useful framework for planners, developers, and decision-makers
to better understand how cities expand and to predict the lasting impacts that
COVID-19 will leave on U.S. cities.
INTRODUCTION
Urban sprawl was one of the central topics on the urban agenda in the 1980s
and 1990s as evidenced by the number of researchers doing work on the topic
(Fishel, 1985; Nelson, 1992; Peiser, 1984; Peiser,1989), but it receded as the return
to the city movement became dominant in urban discourse. The onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the adoption of digital infrastructures, driving
a work from home (WFH) revolution with great implications for the future of cities
and real estate. The functional closure of urban workplaces, schools, and amenities
paused immigration into dense cities and led to a flattening of the bid-rent curve in
many of the most expensive, coastal metros. This spurning of urban density spread
throughout all facets of the public psyche and raises pressing questions for the
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future of cities. As the U.S. emerges from the pandemic, critical research is needed
to assess the lasting impacts and to gauge whether we are in a return to sprawl.
The word ‘sprawl’ is often an unscientific, catch-all term used to describe
any development that is undesirable. By decomposing sprawl into its underlying
traits, Peiser (2001) parsed out truly deleterious effects of sprawl from those that
are simply steps in the land development process. A brief review of the history of
sprawl finds that, contrary to postwar narratives of incessant and gluttonous
suburbanization, sprawl peaked in the mid-90’s and most metropolitan areas have
been compacting since then. However, examining sprawl from strictly metropolitan
perspectives depicts a superficial understanding of developmental paradigms.
By layering in knowledge about sprawl—and the related topic of migration
—across the urban-rural gradient, the nuances and historical patterns are clarified.
While stories of renaissance and revitalization have dominated the urban discourse
over the last 20 years, the data itself does not support the narrative of a broad,
nationwide return to the central cities. Beginning in the late 80’s and cresting
around 2015, America experienced a period of urban revival, which was typified
by the influx of young, educated, and affluent workers, and which revitalized
significant swathes of inner-city real estate.
Most successful urban transformations were isolated to the urban cores of
large cities and existed amid a broader environment of continued suburbanization,
though the flow of urban migrants to suburbs was overshadowed in magnitude by
the movement of rural migrants into metropolitan areas. These contemporaneous
flows of population dramatically altered suburban landscapes, which are now much
denser and more diverse, in many ways coming to resemble their historical urban
cores. As metropolitan areas expanded, communities of “super-commuters”
consumed land at the suburban fringe. With the knowledge that over 96% of rural
net migration occurred in these new exurban enclaves, one can understand how
national development patterns were overwhelmingly concentrative despite the
continued metropolitan expansion.
Before speculating on the long-term impacts of COVID-19 on cities and
metropolitan land consumption, this research takes stock of urban development,
assessing the prevailing migration patterns leading up to the pandemic and
contrasting them with migrations measured during the 2020 lockdowns.
During the pandemic of 2020, most of the noticeable changes in migration
were accelerations rather than reversals of previous patterns. Americans moved, in
aggregate, out of denser neighborhoods and larger metros, especially those metros
with a greater portion of office jobs that could be done remotely. They
overwhelmingly moved to smaller and mid-size metros, less dense parts of their
home metros, and to states with lower housing costs. This significantly flattened
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the bid-rent curve in metropolitan land markets, as suburban housing prices soared,
and urban rents plummeted. However, despite media reports of exoduses from
cities, the biggest changes in urban migration patterns were driven not by outflows,
but rather by plummeting inflows.
The long-term implications largely rest on the lessons learned during the
WFH period and the policies that firms adopt regarding remote work once the
pandemic is over. Our literature review finds that 20-25% of work is estimated to
be done remotely following the pandemic, compared to around 5% before the
outbreak. And though the pandemic has hit urban office markets the hardest, with
demand plummeting 20-30%, there are reasons for cities to be hopeful. Many high
technology companies are hastening moves back into cities, taking advantage of
lower rents and generous terms to develop new buildings and expand campuses.
While the nascent body of pandemic era literature focuses mostly on
employee preferences and the productivity of remote work, evidence suggests that
future research should examine which types of remote firms can and cannot
compete with physically present counterparts in the long run.
Nevertheless, COVID-19 is not causing a return to sprawl because in some
ways cities have never stopped sprawling. Though this may be cause for alarm for
many in the urban discourse, studies of metropolitan expansion find sprawl
narratives to be misleading. Despite many metro areas continuing to consume land
at the urban periphery, negative effects of sprawl are showing signs of abatement,
as newer development tends to be more compact, more accessible, and less
monotonous than earlier suburban developments. Nonetheless, an uptick in the
urbanization of outer-suburban and exurban areas from the pandemic warrants
renewed studies on urban sprawl.
This paper contextualizes pandemic era migration literature with prior
studies of urban sprawl to derive a useful framework for planners, developers, and
decision-makers to better understand how cities expand and to predict the lasting
impacts that COVID-19 will leave on U.S. cities.
PERSPECTIVES ON SPRAWL
Sprawl has become a catch-all term and a scapegoat for everything that is
bad about urban growth today—congestion, blight, monotony, and ecological
destruction to name just a few. But sprawl is a complex and multi-dimensional
concept that demands deeper understanding before provisions can be made to
address its consequences.
Development that is uninterrupted and monotonous, leapfrogs vacant land
at the urban periphery, and/or is designed around the automobile at the expense of
walkability can be described as “sprawling”. When development is sprawling,
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transport and public service costs increase as excess land is consumed, and demand
is directed away from places with existing infrastructure. (Peiser, 2001; Ohls and
Pines 1975, 233).
The blame for sprawl can be spread to all the creators of the built
environment. Where planners adhere to outmoded zoning regulations,
neighborhood groups resist higher density infill, or developers fail to design for
accessibility, sprawl will persist. For many years, sprawl was fueled by government
policy, through the funding of the interstate highway system and Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) policies that provided mortgage insurance only to lowdensity, single family home subdivisions (Peiser, 2001).
Coherent anti-sprawl strategies often evade policymakers because they
mistake normal functions of the land market for sprawl. Peiser (1989) found, for
instance, that discontinuous development and land speculation can be healthy for
cities as vacant space is left behind for future, higher density infill development.
Limited amounts of strip retail can also provide critical services for new residential
developments. In either case, a healthy land market with proper planning
mechanisms should allow space to be denser and include mixed-uses in later stages
of development. Further highlighting the dynamism of the built environment, even
initially monotonous developments like Levittown, NY have developed rich
character over time as housing is redesigned and rebuilt (Waldie, 1996). Cao and
Cory’s (1981) finding that mixed use land increases the value of residential
property also suggests that market forces will diversify monotonous land-use
patterns over time.
Urban sprawl is difficult to measure and perhaps even harder to control. The
focus of most sprawl research has utilized density to depict the phenomenon. This
is problematic because low density development is temporary and arguably the
most fixable of sprawl’s ills - density tends to rise as low-rise residential areas are
brought to higher intensities of development and as accessibility improves (Peiser,
1989). Furthermore, Gordon and Richardson (1997) point out that Los Angeles had
the highest population density of any of the 20 largest metro regions, and few
people would describe the city as the paragon of functional urbanism. Controlling
sprawl has proven difficult in practice because policies tend to misprice costs of
development at the urban fringe without addressing sprawl’s truly deleterious
aspects, such as poor accessibility and the failure to provide open green spaces.
While monotonous housing patterns tend to change over time, clearing space for
roads, transit, trails, and parks is much harder after subdivisions are built.
Historical perspectives on sprawl are key to understanding the paradigms of
metropolitan development. Barrington-Leigh and Millard-Ball (2015) provide a
succinct history of sprawl in the U.S. Focusing on one measure of connectivity, the
mean nodal degrees of intersections, the researchers find that sprawl began well
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before private vehicle ownership became commonplace, it persisted throughout the
20th century, and it peaked around 1994. By 2012, national sprawl had fallen 9%
from the 1994 peak (Barrington-Leigh and Millard-Ball 2015), which suggests the
success of policy changes, such as reducing the preference for single-family
detached housing starting in the 1980’s (Peiser, 2001).
Barrington-Leigh and Millard-Ball (2015) found that the largest increases
in connectivity (decreases in sprawl) occurred where policies promoted gridded,
connected streets, for example by banning or discouraging cul-de-sacs. In places
built with low-connectivity, streets tended to stay that way, implying that poor road
design will lock in travel inefficiencies and emissions well into the future.
However, even in places without codified anti-sprawl policies, the researchers find
that recent suburban development is less sprawling than it was in the past,
suggesting a growing preference of buyers and renters to live in mixed-use,
walkable communities.
Contrary to sprawl research that uses metropolitan areas as a unit of study,
Ewing and Hamidi (2014) measure the sprawling of urbanized areas (UZAs),
geographical units which expand over time as land is consumed. Developing a
“compactness score” that combined data on density, mix of uses, employment, and
street design; the researchers found that sprawl increased “only slightly” from
2000-2010 with great divergences between regions. Cities in the southeast were
found to be the most sprawling and had compactness scores that continued to
decline over the decade. According to Ewing and Hamidi (2014), “Charlotte (is)
now competing to be the next Atlanta.” On the other hand, Los Angeles rose from
the 18th to the 8th most compact metro between 2000-2010 - nearly two-thirds of its
development over the decade was urban infill (Ewing and Hamidi, 2014).
URBAN RENAISSANCE? (1990-2015)
National perspectives on sprawl are helpful to depict broad trends, but more
granularity is needed to sense the movements of people and jobs that are shaping
metropolitan form. Referencing data and narratives on migration patterns from the
last three decades, our research distills an understanding that a renaissance of core
cities prevailed from the early 1990’s until about 2015. This revitalization of large
central cities occurred amid broader growth of suburbs, exurbs, and smaller metros,
especially those in the South and West.
There is a consensus that signs of inner-city revitalization were noticed in
some U.S. cities as early as the late ‘80s. After suffering decades of declining
populations and “white flight”, many cities began to grow again in the 1990’s
(Golding and Winkler, 2020). While earlier, more isolated urban renaissances were
spurred by fringe communities, this movement was typified by the arrival of young,
educated, and affluent workers. By the early 00’s, fast-growing technology firms

Published by Reading Room,

30

Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 5 [], Iss. 1, Art. 7

started to move back into cities, repurposing post-industrial real estate and
reactivating some of the most dilapidated parts of urban cores (Zakrzewski, 2017).
Around this time, education and medicine—“eds and meds”—became a primary
driver for spurring rebirth of urban cores.
One explanation for the population influx to urban cores is that, while prior
generations of college-educated migrants prioritized good schools, low crime, and
job density; the most significant explanation (40%) for young college-educated
migrants between 2000 and 2010 was the density of non-tradable services - the
restaurants, bars, and hair salons colloquially known as “third places.” (Zakrzewski,
2017)
Brombach et al (2017) analyzed four U.S. metros to see where population
growth occurred within the metropolitan areas. (See Figure 1). The growth in urban
cores – defined by the researchers as a 5 km radius from city center – accelerated
until the early ‘00s. In each of the four U.S. metros, migration to cores was
accompanied by declining migration in areas farther than 10 km from city center.
In walkable cities like Boston and Philadelphia, declining growth rates in fartherout suburbs even fell below that of their rising center cities. This makes the case for
the waning of sprawl in some mature coastal metros even while newer metros in
the South and West continued to consume land at the periphery (Brombach et al,
2017).
Using county-to-county migration data, Golding and Winkler (2020)
similarly find that there was a coherent urban renaissance that became measurable
on a nationwide scale starting around 1995 (See Figure 2). Around 1995, migration
started slowing to lower density places, such as mid-size metros, exurbs, and
suburbs, nearly reaching breakeven in 2015. This slowing of metropolitan
expansion was especially pronounced during and after the Great Recession (20082010) and bottomed out around 2015. Inflows to major metropolitan cores during
the late 90’s and early 00’s were significant, but they were concentrated in
relatively few census tracts with very high growth rates, supporting anecdotes of
the widespread repurposing of previously industrial areas. Though these areas
experienced explosive growth as the beneficiaries of targeted government
investments and incentives, this was overshadowed by the prevailing growth in
suburbs and exurbs.
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Figure 1
Population Change in Ring Zones of US Metropolitan Regions
Source: Brombach, Jessen, Siedentop and Zakrzewski (2017). Reproduced with permission.
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Figure 2
Average Net Migration by Rural-Urban Gradient Class (1990-2016)
Source: Golding and Winkler (2020). Reproduced with permission.
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In the years leading up to the pandemic, there were signs that the urban
renaissance had crested and that the broader movement to less dense and more
affordable places had resurfaced. Despite just 5 big cities losing population in 20112012, 14 big cities shrank in 2015-16, with Chicago losing more than any other
city. Of the 10 fastest growing metros in 2017, all but Charleston, SC experienced
comparably rapid growth in the 80’s and 90’s, and many of the slowest-growing
metros were also near the bottom in the earlier decades (Kolko, 2017).
The literature holistically supports that a period of urban renaissance lasted
roughly from 1990-2015 albeit with some qualifications. Although some parts of
cities experienced significant influxes of people in their prime earning years (age
25-50), the return to the American city was largely childless (Brombach et al, 2017;
Zakrzewski, 2017) with the share of children in cities declining precipitously from
1990 to 2010 (Brombach et al, 2017). Kolko (2017) solidifies the point, claiming
that the “...Urban revival is real, but it has mostly been for rich, educated people in
particular hyper-urban neighborhoods rather than a broad-based return to city
living.” (Kolko, 2017) Nevertheless, historic paradigms of de-densifying
metropolitan migrations started reasserting themselves in earnest 3-5 years before
the start of the pandemic. Rising crime has also been cited as a driver of
suburbanization (Peiser, 2001; Cullen and Levitt, 1996; Rusk, 1995), and it is likely
that crime contributed to urban outflows in the later 2010’s as well.
IMPACT OF THE PANDEMIC
Though the pandemic is still unfolding as of January 2022, the most recent
literature supports that the migration patterns of 2020 broadly resemble those in
decades prior. Urban-suburban migration research is complicated because suburban
counties often have recognizably urban areas while core cities have neighborhoods
that are topologically suburban. Whitaker (2021) categorizes census tracts as urban
if they are in a metro with at least 500,000 people where the density exceeds 7,000
per sq. mi. or if the majority of the housing stock was built before WWII. Figure 3
shows how net outmigration has accelerated since 2015 and skyrocketed in 2020,
but a closer look at the changes between years 2019 and 2020 in Figure 4 reveals
that a fall in inflows is a primary driver of this delta.
During the pandemic, people moved out of denser neighborhoods in
metropolitan areas where a higher share of people work in jobs that could be done
from home. The biggest pandemic shifts were related to people moving out of the
urban parts of a few large metros at higher rates, and more people moving into
smaller metros. This was especially pronounced in New York’s Hudson River
Valley, rural parts of New England, and other places viewed as an escape from
nearby cities (Kolko et al, 2021).
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Figure 3
Estimated Net Out-migration from Urban neighborhoods
Source: Whitaker (2021).
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Figure 4
Estimated Gross Migration into and From Urban Neighborhoods
Source: Whitaker (2021).

Published by Reading Room,

36

Journal of Comparative Urban Law and Policy, Vol. 5 [], Iss. 1, Art. 7

Despite the media narratives, postal service change of address data does not
support New York or California-specific exoduses nor a remote-working boon for
declining communities (Kolko et al, 2021). While some smaller metro areas and
vacation hubs saw increases in migrants, data suggests that the greatest
beneficiaries of urban outmigration were other communities relatively close by.
Areas that had been attracting people since 2015 kept attracting them, while those
that were losing people lost more (Tavernise and Mervosh, 2020).
CONCLUSIONS
The WFH movement has had complex implications for migration and land
consumption patterns, but mostly reinforced trends that were underway long before
the outbreak in the U.S. Researchers concur in predicting that 20-25% of the 160
million U.S. workers will stay fully remote long term (Florida and Ozimek, 2021;
Barrero et al, 2021), compared to 5% before the pandemic. Davis et al (2021)
agrees, finding through surveys that, once the pandemic subsides, workers expect
to approximately triple their WFH time compared to pre-pandemic levels. If this
permanent shift to WFH comes to fruition, spending on meals, entertainment,
personal services, and shopping in major city centers could decline by 5-10%
(Barrero, 2021; Medici, 2021)
As of late December 2021, 242 million people (74%) in the U.S. have
received at least one vaccine dose and 205 million people (63%) are fully
vaccinated. Much of the country is accelerating towards full reopening, although
the delta and omicron variants are causing surges in COVID that are stalling this
progress. From Wall St. to Main St., firms are actively reconsidering their WFH
policies, balancing the impacts to productivity with the location preferences of their
workforce. Some companies have embraced remote work, citing savings on office
leases and access to a broader pool of talent (Florida and Ozimek, 2021). And
research suggests that the average worker is willing to take a small pay cut to
continue working from home two or three days a week (Barrero, 2021; Medici,
2021). Remote employees at some firms, like San Jose-based VMWare are already
making less than their cubicled counterparts (Kolakowski, 2020).
But there are limits to this focus on employee preferences and remote work
productivity gains, approximately 80% of which accrue through commute-related
savings (Barrero, 2021; Medici, 2021). The future of work and the relevance of
standard urban models is not decided by workers or even their managers —in the
long run this will be a question of competitiveness. Some firms may be better suited
for a remote environment, and their shareholders will enjoy the savings of
plummeting operating costs. Other firms may capitalize on decentralized labor
pools and attract top talent who have decamped to places like Bozeman, MT;
Truckee, CA; or New York’s Hudson Valley to live a more bucolic life. Invariably
some remote firms will lose their edge. Creative synergy may atrophy in the
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absence of spontaneous relationships between coworkers. Less productive, inperson workers could get promoted ahead of more qualified remote workers.
Remote firms run the risk of stifling their own innovation, as short-sighted costsaving decisions lead to reduced market share or even obsolescence.
There is growing evidence of this innovation divergence at play. Amid the
broader trend of metropolitan job decentralization, firms in innovative and creative
industries have continued their move into urban cores with many taking advantage
of lowered rents and generous terms to accelerate their plans (Matsuda, 2021; Haag,
2020).
According to Branson (2020), "What we have seen over the past 25 years is
that those businesses that have been the most able to work remotely have done
precisely the opposite. They have clustered in the center of successful cities."
Literature predicts that after the pandemic, ambitious young people will once again
migrate into cities at high rates (Florida and Ozimek, 2021), and models paint an
optimistic picture of a new urban revival, with rent growth in cities expected to
outpace suburbs for the foreseeable future (Gupta, 2021; Oklobzija, 2020; Beilfuss,
2021). One likely outcome from an increase to WFH acceptance is the rise of
satellite communities, those areas within a reasonable commute of a metropolitan
office, but from which a daily commute would be impractical (Kolko, 2021).
Planners and developers should pay particular attention to this possibility, as the
rise of satellite cities could strain lower-capacity regional transportation systems
and eventually propagate labor markets distinct from their original metropolitan
context.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Following two decades of predominant research on renaissances, the
pandemic has repositioned the urban sprawl debate at the forefront of the urban
agenda. While stories abound about urban dwellers relocating to the suburbs and to
more distant exurban and rural communities where they work from home, future
research should analyze not only where population growth and decline has taken
place but also how patterns of density and urban concentration and de-concentration
have occurred. Anecdotal evidence suggests that new suburban patterns of
development are promoting mixed use and higher density urban infill. Whether this
evidence is supported by the data needs further investigation, especially after the
nation has moved on from the pandemic.
As noted by the urban academic, Chris Nelson, while market demand for
new forms of suburbs is well known, entrenched suburban planning institutions
usually sap the creativity out of well-meaning developers wanting to meet that
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demand.1 There are also important equity lenses through which these
developmental questions must be examined. Nelson points out that although three
quarters of all new household formations are non-White, approximately threequarters of pandemic-era homebuyers have been White. Climate change also is a
critical factor affecting both where people will choose to live and whether sprawl
will persist. It is possible that the rising cost of new housing as well as disincentives
for driving will support demand in higher density urban and suburban development,
thereby mitigating a return to sprawl. The housing choices that underserved parts
of the market make will effectively determine whether we see a return to patterns
of urban sprawl.
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